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U.S. Army. Forces in the European Theater, G-3. Foreign personnel for guard units. 1946.

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
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(Classification)

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER

JOPS LINE European Treater, G-3.

FILE NO: GCT/600.96/OPS

SUBJECT: Foreign Personnel for Guard Units.

DATE: 20 May 1946

	(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)				
No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?	
1.	G- 3	G-4	20 May 1946	l. This Division initiated a staff study recommending that the War Department be requested to authorize the Theater to employ 50,000 Polish personnel in guard companies, rether than the 40,000 presently authorized.	
Den	mark tl	at they	nvest i ga	2. The Chief of Staff returned the study to await the Military Attaches in Belgium, the Netherlands, and te the possibilities of obtaining service units from those in the U.S. Zone, Germany.	
the	re is 1	o possib	llity of	3. Replies from the Military Attaches indicated that obtaining guard units from any of the three countries.	
an	increa	sed number	of Poli	4. The Theater Commander does not desire to employ sh personnel.	
p os sup	sibili plement	y of using or even	ng Baltic Tually to	5. At present this Division is investigating the personnel and/or German civilians in guard units to replace the Polish units.	
	2 2 vo	۷.		RODERICK R. ALLEN Brigadier General, GSC AC of S, G-3	
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I, THE PROBLEM

To determine the feasibility of using Germans in police functions and guard functions similar to those now performed by Poles.

II. DISCUSSION

- 1. The Theater Commander desires to reduce the number of Poles performing guard duty over prisoners-of-war and installations in the American occupied zone and other areas.
- 2. Peoples available to perform these duties must come from indigenous sources. Attempts to obtain assistance by requests to the Governments of Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands has resulted in a negative answer due to the shortages of manpower within those countries. The indigenous sources remaining available consist of stateless persons and Germans. Of the stateless persons, the largest group consists of 17,120 Balts, if the Poles are eliminated. It is undesirable to use Balts because they are considered by the Soviet Government to be citizens of Soviet States and the political implications of arming these Balts to be used in organized guard companies might endanger our position in diplomatic conferences. In addition, the small number, after being screened, would probably produce a number insufficient for the purposes visualized.
- The best remaining source of guard type personnel is the Germans themselves. The spirit of the Potsdam agreement and other agreements establishing the cessation of hostilities precludes the use of the Germans in anything approaching the military formation or allowing a military type of training. Nevertheless, it will become necessary within the next two or three years to properly screen and train various types of German police organizations, which will be able eventually to take over the police functions of the U. S. Constabulary The principle difficulty lies in obtaining officers from among the Germans who can command and control guard companies. To establish the large number of officers in command of organizations might be classified as reestablishing a military organization and an officers corps inside Germany. This would violate the Potsdam agreement and it would be open to criticism by the Anssians and the other allies, as well as the press through its representatives in the sould.
- 4. There exist idea, police organizations on the city police level. It will be necessary to obtain the authority of the Allied Control Council before establishing a German police system on the Lander level. If this permission can local the counter of the city police level.

be obtained, the Lander police can be given the additional mission of guarding

U. S. military installations and perhaps, as well, the mission of guarding prisonersof-war and civilian internees.

- 5. A proposed plan for discharging prisoners-of-war in order to obtain a civilian status for them, and to hold these prisoners-of-war in a civilian internee status under German guards for the purpose of obtaining the required labor troops, is considered inadvisable for two reasons:
 - a. It is not believed the German guards would cooperate;
- b. It is believed that this is a violation of international law as it would require the forced detention of a large group of civilians without adequate cause.
- 6. It is not believed acceptable to the AC of S, G-2 that the German guards should guard prisoners-of-war or civilian internees of the automatic arrest category nor that German guards should have anything to do with persecutee camps.

III. CONCLUSIONS

- 1. German guards would be suitable as installation guards only within the U. S. Zone of Germany and not within the liberated areas of Europe.
 - 2. German guards would not be acceptable as personnel guards.
- 3. If German companies were organized, their officer personnel would have to be non-German.
- 4. Permission of the Allied Control Council must be procurred before it will be possible to establish the Lander police forces required to guard U. S. Army installations.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1. That the Allied Control Council be requested to authorize the establishment of a Lander police force to be supervised by the U. S. Constabulary on the Lander level for the purposes of relieving U. S. forces now performing those duties and for the additional purpose of setting up a German police system capable of taking over from the Constabulary when this might be required.
- 2. That all guard companies, now organized, within the limits established by the War Department, be relieved as soon as possible from guarding installations and be placed on personnel guard duty only.
- 3. That guard units not be formed from those nationals over whom the Soviet Government claims sovereignty.

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HEADQUARTERS US FORCES EUROPFAN THEATER G-3 Division

Sendontagain

BRIEF

U.S. Army, Forces in the Eu

28 June 1946

I. PROBLEM

Thater, 63.
To determine the possibility of using Balts and/or Germans in Guard

II. FACTS

Companies.

- 1. U. S. Forces in Europe employing maximum of War Department guards in companies 40,000 at present time.
 - 2. No more authorized but circa 10,000 more needed.
- 3. New guard company control and training scheme, under G-4, will considerably raise guard company efficiency and standards begins to be effective about 1 August.
- 4. Of 85,000 Balts in Zone, 17,000 are effectives for work. They have not been approached or screened. The number who would and could work is unknown.
- 5. Due to limitations of Potsdam, using Germans in guard companies is a delicate problem best solution is to use a new Leender level police force instead. Police force would have to be organized.

III. DISCUSSION

- 1. State Department sees no political reason for not using Balts. This based on about-face toward any Soviet criticism that we are "training counter-revolutionaries" in Balts whose countries are now Soviet states, but not officially recognized as such by the State Department. May change again.
- 2. G-4 does not went Balts. New guard company training program would have to be thrown out and a Esthonian-Latvian-Lithuanean language training program instituted. When trained, Balts would take place of Poles, who would have to be discharged to make room for Balts, and would be thrown, as trained men, on German economy.
- 5. G-1, G-2 and G-4 do not concur in the use of German guards or Laender police on prisoner of war enclosures or civilian internee camps.
- 4. G-5 does not concur in a Leender police since it parallels Post-War I, rise of Wehrmacht out of the old Laender police.
- 5. G-1, G-2, G-4 concur in use of German installation guards from German sources as individuals Same implied about the Balts.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

1. German Laender police should be started since they will be coming up someday in the future.

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- a. Laender police to guard our installations.
- b. Laender Police to operate close liaison with Constabulary Brigade headquarters.
- 2. Balts to be used as individuals as far as possible and relieve Guard companies in such work as they can perform locally thus possibly increasing guard companies by 10,000 needed.
- 3. Balts not to be used where U. S. has to feed, clothe and equip them an added supply burden.
- 4, German individual guards already being used to maximum under Third U.S. Army.
- 5. Guard companies of other nationals, of the Polish Guard Company type, should not be instituted until:
 - a. New program has time to prove itself,
 - b. additional guard companies are authorized.
- 6. No one wants to assume responsibility for setting up German guard companies.
- 7. Main objections to Polish guard companies should be removed by new G-4 training and screening program, plus G-5 forced repatriation for Poles who are law-breakers.

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